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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a divorce case. Defendant has appealed from a property modification made 
by The Honorable David C. Nye, Sixth District Judge, following the original trial before 
Magistrate Judge Gaylen L. Box. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
This divorce action was filed October 12, 2011 by Jessica Kawamura and assigned 
to Magistrate Judge Gaylen L. Box. Docket 1. Trial took place on October 30, 2012. 
The Magistrate's Decision was entered December 27, 2012 and the District Court Appeal 
was decided March 18, 2014. 
The Trial Proceedings 
Following discovery, the trial before Judge Box took place October 30, 2012. Tr. 
1. Mrs. Kawamura testified (Tr. 4:19-94:12) followed by the Defendant, his parents and 
his grandmother. Tr. 96:7-206:2. Fifteen exhibits were offered and admitted; Plaintiffs 
exhibits 1-14 and Defendant's Exhibit A. Originals clipped together with court file. 
Stipulations on income, property, medical/daycare costs, and custody/visitation 
were read into the record before the taking of testimony. Tr. 3:23, 1:17-3:7, 36:4-11. One 
stipulation material to this appeal was that the home on Gwen where the parties were 
living in at the time of the divorce was worth $165,000. Tr. 36:7-10. 
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Order of Testimony 
For convenience in reference the Trial testimony went as follows: 
Witness & Examination 
Jessica Kawamura Direct/Cross/Redirect/Recross 
Jessica Kawamura Redirect/Recross 
Eric Kawamura - Direct/Cross 
Lunch recess ll:57AM-l:14PM 
Eric Kawamura Redirect/Recross/Redirect 
Tomi Kavvamura Direct/Cross 
Gary Kawamura - Direct/Cross/Redirect 
Carol Kawamura Direct/Cross 
Both parties rest 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Transcript Reference 









Jessica and Eric Kawamura were married August 4, 2001 in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
Tr. 5:12; 53:12; Amended Complaint, ,r2; Answer to Amended Complaint ,r2; Tr. 96:22. 
Because "Eric did not want his parents to know that we eloped in Vegas" a year later they 
went through another ceremony on August 4, 2002 in American Falls, Idaho. Tr. 90:3-5; 
97:3-6. They had two children, a daughter and a son: "A.K."  and "I.K." 
. Tr. 5:13-18; Amended Complaint, ,rs; Answer to Amended Complaint 
,rs. 
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Both Jessica and Eric worked outside the home during the marriage. Eric was a 
warehouse worker for Heinz Foods. Tr. 9:4-6. Jessica initially worked at the Sheep Shop 
and Remos Restaurant and later as a CNA at Southeastern Idaho In-Home Health 
Services. Tr. 54:1-4, 80:2-18, 81:8-9. In 2007 Jessica completed a Registered Nurse 
degree at Idaho State University and was employed at PortneufMedical Center in 
Pocatello. Tr. 8:11; 81:5. But even while working towards that Registered Nurse degree 
Jessica had "a work-study job" that brought income to the marriage. Tr. 81:8-9. 
Hostility to Jessica's Contributions to the Marriage 
Eric was extremely hostile to Jessica's contributions to the marriage both as a wife 
and mother and wage earner claiming he "pretty much paid all the bills." Tr. 102:25. He 
even testified his income was not community income1 because Jessica "didn't really 
work" though that was not the fact. Tr. 129:12-21; Tr. 131:20. 
Initially Eric even denied Jessica paid any community bills other than the cell 
phone and cable bill. Tr. 118:6-11. Ultimately he had to admit "She just, she always paid 
daycare" in addition to all the food for the family and clothing for the two children. Tr. 
118:17-19, 122:11-24. When pressed further he admitted that he didn't know of anything 
that her money was used for that went 100% to her and finally volunteered "I was a poor 





135:11. Joint tax return tax refunds were always deposited directly into Eric's account. 
1 Eric calied his father, Gary Kawamura, to testify. Gary, though weil educated, claimed he did 
not understand that wages earned during an Idaho marriage were community money. Tr. 180:3-15. 
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Jessica Always Contributed Community Earnings to Their Homes 
When Jessica and Eric married in 200 l Eric had a small home at 319 South 
Johnson. Tr. 53:10-25. Jessica contributed community income to the maintenance of that 
home and marriage by working "a home health job as a CNA." Tr. 54:4. 
In February of 2002, that South Johnson home was sold and a new home on 636 
Highland Boulevard in Pocatello was purchased for $85,000. Tr. 54:11-20, 63:5; Exhibit 
A, p. 11 Warranty Deed). That transaction was closed with a cashier's check in the 
amount of $52,090.37 payable "To the Order of First American Land Title" showing the 
funds came from Bob Y. Kawamura, Eric's grandfather. Tr. 48:12-49:22, 50:10-13,58:8-
11, 100:24-101 :8; Exhibit 14. 
Defendant contended at trial that the money from his grandfather was a gift solely 
for Defendant. Tr. 101:14-24. But there was nothing given to them at the time that 
Highland Boulevard home was purchased to suggest that the money was only given to 
"one or the other" of the two. Tr. 50:17-24, 51:12-15. Nor was there any testimony from 
Bob Kawamura nor any documentary evidence from him of any such limited intent. Tr. 
180:16-181:3. Objections to Defense efforts to have others testify to Bob Kawamura's 
"gift" state of mind were sustained by the Court. Tr. 170:14-171 :3, 193:19-194:8. 
Highland Boulevard Home a Joint Marital Selection 
That Highland Boulevard home was not previously owned by either Jessica or Eric 
- "We bought it together. We were married." Tr. 49:10-13. Though married at the time 
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of that purchase the deed to that house on Highland Boulevard was from Ian Harvan, an 
unmarried person, to Eric Kawamura. Tr. 89:3-7; Exhibit A. 
That Highland Boulevard home was paid off during the marriage and the 
home equity was used to take out a home equity loan to pay other community bills with a 
higher interest rates. Tr. 67:12-22, 92:12-17, 129:8-11. 
Home at 1540 Gwen Drive - Warrantv Deed in Both Names 
The focus of this appeal is the parties' third home at 1540 Gwen Drive in 
Pocatello. At the time of the divorce trial the parties had resided in that home since 2008. 
Exhibit 12. The Warranty Deed furnished "at the time of closing" at First American Title 
conveyed that home to" Eric and Jessica Kawamura, Husband and Wife." Exhibit 12; Tr. 
42:1, 43:10-25. 2 
The loan on the Gwen Drive home was a no-interest loan from Eric's parents, Gary 
and Carol Kawamura. Tr. 172:24-25, 179:21-23. The testimony was that the loan was 
paid by "automatically" withholding $400 every two weeks from Eric's paycheck at 
Heinz 26 payments per year equaling $10,400 per year. Tr. 42:11-16, 69:2-16. The 
starting loan balance was $78,750. Tr. 201:14-16. 
Carol Kawamura testified that the loan principal balance had been reduced over 
the four years of that loan to $43,5503 as of the time of trial. Tr. 205:14-16. However, 
2 Eric's father, Gary Kawamura, was called to testify and he stated he considered the joint 
ownership Warranty Deed to be immaterial "because Eric is paying for that home" while Jessica was 
paying all the other non-home bills of the family. Tr. 179:18-20. 
3 Jessica had been told some time prior to trial that the loan principal balance was $45,575. Tr. 
12:11-22. 
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that was mathematically at odds with the undisputed testimony from all witnesses that 
Eric made 26 payments of $400 every two weeks for all of the four years they had that 
home together - $400 paid "26 times a year" "'I have 26 pay periods in a year." Tr. 
42:11-18, 69:2-4, 106:1-11, 179:24-180:2, 201:17-202:3. 
Those every-tvw-weeks $400 loan payments totaled $10,600 per year for a total of 
$41,600 over the four years they had the Gwen home together. A reduction of $41,600 to 
that initial loan balance of $78,750 would only have left a loan balance of $37,150 at the 
time of trial. 
Course of Proceedings 
The Magistrate awarded nothing to Jessica for any community interest from all the 
years that community income had fully paid off the Highland Boulevard home and 
substantially reduced the mortgage balance of the Gwen Drive home. Memorandum 
Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order (12-27-12). 
On appeal by Jessica to the District Court, Judge David C. Nye reversed and 
remanded to the magistrate comi as to the home equity and joint ownership issues. 
Decision on Appeal (3-18-14). 
Defendant then appealed to this Court. 
Defendant's Issues on Appeal 
l. Defendant states as his first "Issue Preserved on Appeal" that the District Judge 
"correctly applied the appropriate standard of review" as to the Magistrate's findings and 
that it \Vas proper for the i1agistrate to allow parole evidence to override the clear and 
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unambiguous warranty deed that had both parties names on the Gwen Drive home. 
Exhibit 12 .. Defendant's Appeal Brief, page 2. Defendant probably intended the word 
"incorrectly." 
2. Defendant's second issue is whether District Judge Nye "correctly applied Idaho 
law" as to the determination of a joint community interest in the equity in the Gwen Drive 
home resulting from the pay-down of the underlying mortgage with community property 
mcome. 
3. Defendant asse1is a third point "(c)" on page 23 of his brief that is not stated in 
the Table of Contents. The 9-lines under that point ( c) is devoid of argument or citation 
to the record and thus cannot be asserted on appeal. 
Such is insufficient under established appellate rules. Arguments "not 
supported ... by propositions of law or authority" are waived. Eagle Water Company, Inc. 
v. Roundy Pole Fence Company, 134 Idaho 626, 629-30, 7 P.3d 1103, 1106-1107 (2000). 
"A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or 
argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking." Young 
Electric Sign Co. v. State~ Winde~ 135 Idaho 804, 810, 25 
P.3d 117, 123 (2001); Weaver v. Searle Brothers, 131 Idaho 
610, 616, 962 P.2d 381, 387 (1998) (Italics in original). 
NO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Neither party seeks attorney fees on appeal. 
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THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW 
IN NOT ALLOWING PAROLE EVIDENCE TO ALTER THE 
WARRANTY DEED TO DELETE PLAINTIFF AS A JOINT OWNER 
The totality of Defendant's first argument on appeal is one for allowing a "clear 
and unambiguous deed" Exhibit 12 herein to be altered by parole evidence. 
Defendant's Appeal Brief, p. 13-19. That is not the law. 
Under the heading "\Varranty Deed and Transmutation of the Gwen Prope1iy" 
the District Court very concisely and correctly applied Idaho law in a section that was 
just a few lines over two pages. Decision on Appeal, pages 4-6 (3-18-14). Here is what 
he stated: 
* * * 
In determining that the Gwen home was Defendant's separate property in spite 
of the fact that Appellant's name also appears on the warranty deed, the trial court 
stated: 
While the name on the deed is some evidence of the nature 
of the Gwen property the court finds that the testimony of 
the donor as to the nature of the $52,090 transfer of funds to 
the defendant [Husband], and the fact that the plaintiffs 
[Wife's] name was never on the Highland home is strong 
evidence that the Gwen property was purchased with the 
defendant's separate money and is his separate prope1iy. 
[ Citing Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law & Order, p.3] 
* * * 
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Thus, the trial court determined that the appearance of both parties' names on the 
Warranty Deed did not signify that the property had been transmuted from separate to 
community property. 
However, the trial court misstated and improperly applied the law in determining 
the character of property in a divorce proceeding as either community or separate 
property. The trial court appears to have relied on language from Barrett v. Barrett where 
the Idaho Supreme Court stated that while a trial court "may consider a deed as evidence 
in determining intent, it is not the only evidence available to a judge considering the 
question oftransmutation."[citing Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 21, 24,232 P.3d 799, 
802 (2010).] Barrett is distinguishable from the present matter as the holding was 
limited to cases of refinancing and did not involve a third party deed, but involved a 
quitclaim deed between a wife and her husband. The Supreme Comi made it clear that 
Barrett was a narrow and limited exception to the parole evidence rule when it later 
stated: 
Although unnecessary to the determination of this appeal, we feel it is 
important to reiterate the limited scope of our holding in Barrett v. 
Barrett, 149 Idaho 21,232 P.3d 799 (2010). In that case we held that 
"the language of a deed executed in the course of refinancing does not 
conclusively determine the character of property for purposes of a 
divorce action." Id. at 24, 232 P.3d at 802. That is a narrow exception to 
the general requirement that deeds are to be interpreted by their plain 
language. This Court recognized that when a deed is executed at the 
behest of a bank during refinancing, it is not necessarily a completely 
accurate portrayal of the grantor's intent. Barrett should not be 
interpreted as allowing extrinsic evidence in other situations where 
the deed is unambiguous. [citing Garrett v. Garrett, 154 Idaho 788, 
791 n. 1, 302 P.3d 1061, 1064 n.1 (2013)] 
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Thus, although the Barrett opinion appears to disparage the law as stated in Hall v. 
Hall, the law in Hall is still controlling and relevant in this matter. The Court in Hall 
stated that: "Where the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous the intention of 
the parties must4 be determined from the deed itself, and parol evidence is not 
admissible to show intent." [citing Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483, 484, 777 13.2d 255, 256 
(1989)]. 
This case involves a question of whether the Gwen home, which was purchased in 
part with Defendant's separate property, was transmuted to community property through 
operation of the Warranty Deed, which transfers a fee simple interest in the Gwen 
property to "Eric Kawamura and Jessica Kawamura, husband and wife." [Citing Trial 
Exhibit 12; Warranty Deed, pg. 9 of Appellant·s Reply Brief.]. When transmutation of 
property is being asserted, the party making the assertion must prove the requisite intent 
to transmute by clear and convincing evidence. [Citing Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 
222, 657 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Ct. App. 1983)]. The Warranty Deed is clear and convincing 
evidence. This case does not involve refinancing and the deed is from a third party and 
not a bank. The deed is not ambiguous. Therefore, Hall controls in this case and intent 
must be determined from the deed itself. The deed conveys the property in fee simple to 
both Defendant and Plaintiff. The trial court looked beyond the deed and considered 
parole evidence when determining the character of the Gwen property. This was improper 
and an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the issue of the character of the Gwen property is 
4 All italics and bold herein are added unless stated otherwise. 
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* * * 
Defendant's Appeal brief herein argues "Judge Nye assumes that the Barrett 
opinion controls the reasoning behind the Magistrate Court's findings." Defendant's 
Appeal Brief, p. 13. Defendant further states that "The implication that the Magistrate 
Comi did not consider Hall and only relied on Barrett to form his findings is an incorrect 
conclusion." Defendant's Appeal Brief, p. 13. 
Those statements have no basis in the record; Judge Box did not cite any court 
cases in issuing his Decision. Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law & Order (12-27-12). However, Defendant did cite to Barrett in his brief before the 
District Court but incorrectly citing it and failing to pick up the caveat contained in the 
Opinion cited by Judge Nye. This is what Defendant stated at the time: 
"Although the trial judge, as the finder of fact, may consider a deed 
determining intent, it is not the only evidence available to a judge 
considering the question of transmutation. Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 2 I, 
232 P.3d 799 (2010). 
- Defendant's District Court brief, p. 13. 
In bringing this appeal, Defendant does not address the Garrett decision that was 
the specific focus of Judge Nye's decision in correctly pointing out that the holding in 
Barrett is to be narrowly applied only to a refinancing case and not "in other situations" 
as stated in Garrett v. Garrett, 154 Idaho 788, 791 n. 1, 302 P.3d 1061, 1064 n.1 (2013). 
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I . . -
This Court was firm in Garrett that a clear and unambiguous deed cannot be modified by 
parole evidence: 
Although unnecessary to the determination of this appeal, we feel it is 
important to reiterate the limited scope of our holding in Barrett v. Barrett, 
149 Idaho 21, 232 P.3d 799 (2010). In that case we held that "the language 
of a deed executed in the course of refinancing does not conclusively 
determine the character of property for purposes of a divorce action." Id. at 
24, 232 P.3d at 802. That is a narrow exception to the general requirement 
that deeds are to be interpreted by their plain language. This Court 
recognized that when a deed is executed at the behest of a bank during 
refinancing, it is not necessarily a completely accurate portrayal of the 
grantor's intent. Barrett should not be interpreted as allowing extrinsic 
evidence in other situations where the deed is unambiguous. - Garrett v. 
Garrett, 154 Idaho 788, 791 n. 1, 302 P.3d 1061, 1064 n.1 (2013) 
The Evolution through /Ioskinson to Barrett 
Before Judge Nye the Defendant argued that Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 
448, 80 P.3d 1049 (2003), decided prior to Barrett, supported his argument for the marital 
home being solely his property. See, Defendant's District Court brief, page 14. 
Hoskinson involved a deed given solely to "facilitate the financing" and that the joint 
deed was signed among "many other papers" that the "lender presented to him during the 
loan closing." Hoskinson, 139 Idaho at 459, 80 P.3d at 1060. That element was lacking 
in this case. 
Joint names did not just "happen" to "appear" on the Warranty Deed. Specifically, 
Defendant's District Court appeal brief argued the joint names \Varranty Deed on the 
home on 1540 Gwen Drive was "the only time" Jessica's name "happened to appear on 
the deed." Defendant's District Court brief, page 16. Similarly, Defendant referenced 
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that joint Warranty Deed at the outset of his District Comi brief by referring to it a "the 
mere existence of a deed" as if it was only incidental. Defendant's District Court brief, 
page 6, "Statement of Issues #2. That mere-happened argument was then asserted as an 
"inadvertent mistake by the closing agent" that "occurred without my direction or 
approval": 
"an inadvertent mistake by the closing agent that occurred 
without my direction or approval."5 Defendant's Brief, 
page 16 
That "mistake" and "played no part" argument was made by Defendant was made 
in his District Court brief even though it was undisputed that Defendant was "present at 
the closing." Defendant's District Court brief, page 16. 
Jessica's name jointly on the Warranty Deed was neither a mistake nor was it 
inadvertent. Nor was it something that occurred "by the closing agent" to which Eric 
Kawamura was unaware. His specific notice, knowledge and consent of that joint '"Eric 
Ka,vamura and Jessica Kawamura, husband and wife" warranty deed is shown by the 
initials of both Eric and Jessica to the left of their names on the Exhibit 12 Warranty 
Deed: 
5 The paragraph from which this comes is the third paragraph on page 16 of Defendant's District 
Court Appeal Brief. It appears to be something that Defendant gave to his legal counsel and was just 
inserted in the Defendant's District Court brief verbatim. This contention was not made to Judge Box; it 
is nowhere to be found in the trial transcript. Nor do any phrases such as "without my direction" or 
"inadvertent mistake" or even words like "inadvertent" appear in the trial transcript. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF JESSICA KAWAMURA - Page 15 












~ Pioneer Co. 
135 N. Arthur Ave./ Pirtatello, fdnho 83204 
(208) 233·9S95 
irr:w,L nwmn aiuL'tF/· 
E;MHIOCK COUNTY !01\1-IO 
2082673"/ 
P.r.COf::QEj} Af HEJlU):ST_ Q~, 
Fff_.;;l__DEPU I Y :;/:J:U.,V 
PIGl:iF.[R TITLE 
2082b73l zuos uEc 11 P 2, ow 
OrdcrNo. 20081674MOLT 
WARRANTY DEED 
For Value Received 
Donnld E. Obert nnd J acquelyn A. Obert, lmsb:lud and wife 
herei11after referred to as Gran tor, does hereby grant, bargain, self, ,varrant and convey unto 
{~ Eric l<nwnmura and J essica Kawa mura, busband nod wife 
hereinafter referred to as Grantee, whose current address is 1540 Gwen Drive, Pocatello, ID 83204 !he 
following described premises, to-wit: 
Loi 38, Block 3, HrLLSIDE SUBDIVISION, as the same appears on lhc official plat thereof, filed in the 
office of the County Recorder of Bannock County, ldaho. 
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THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW 
AS TO AN INTEREST FROM PAY-DOWN Of THE UNDERLYING 
MORTGAGE PRINCIPAL FROM REGULAR COMMUNITY INCOME 
PAYMENTS TOWARDS THE MORTGAGE 
Defendant's second point argues that any community money paid to reduce the 
home loan balance did not enhance the value of the Gwen property but nowhere 
addresses any error of Judge Nye. Defendant's District Court brief, pages 19-23. 
Indeed, the words "District Court" nor "Judge Nye" nor any citation to Judge Nye's 
March 18, 2014 appear anywhere in those four pages. Curiously, there are three citations 
to "Reply Brief of Jessica Kawamura" pages 2 and 10 as if Defendant were before the 
Judge Nye at the district court. Defendant's District Court brief, pages 19-20. 
Thus, absent any error of Judge Nye being specified, one has to guess what the 
argument was intended to be. That is not sufficient under Eagle Water Company, Inc. v. 
Roundy Pole Fence Company, 134 Idaho 626, 629-30, 7 P.3d 1103, 1106-1107 (2000); 
Young Electric Sign Co. v. State, Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 810, 25 P.3d 117, 123 (2001); 
Weaver v. Searle Brothers, 131 Idaho 610,616,962 P.2d 381,387 (1998). 
Nevertheless, Plaintiff will address what is guessed to be the intended argument 
that pay-down of the underlying mortgage loan with community property wages does not 
create community property equity. 
Under the heading "Equity in the Gwen Home" the District Court again 
concisely and correctiy applied Idaho law in a section that was just under two pages. 
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Decision on Appeal, pages 4-6 (3-18-14). Here is what the District Court stated: 
* * * 
U. Equity in the Gwen Home 
Appellant also challenges the trial court's determination that the value of the Gwen 
home decreased since it was purchased and that there was no community interest in the 
Gwen home. The analysis in the trial court decision on this issue is limited to the 
following: 
Even though payments to his parents for the loan on the Gwen house were 
made from the defendant's salary, which was community property, there is 
no proof that the payment from the community funds in any way increased 
the value of or the equity in the house on Gwen. The Gwen house was 
purchased in 2008 for $172,291. Its value today is $165,000. It has 
depreciated in value and the community has no interest in the house. 
[ Citing Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & 
Order, p.3] 
The testimony in the record from Respondent is that he paid $400 every two weeks 
or 26 total payments per year towards a loan from his parents and that he was continuing 
to make those payments as of the date of the court trial. The home was purchased in 
December 2008. Assuming payments on the loan began in January 2009 and continued to 
the date of trial in October 2012, there would have been approximately 95 payments (78 
payments for the first 3 years and roughly 17 payments in 8 months of 2012) of $400 for a 
total of $38,000 dollars in reimbursement on the no-interest loan from his parents. This 
would indicate that $38,000 worth of equity had been established in the Gwen home. The 
pay1nents were made with income that was community property. Even assuming that the 
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bulk of the Gwen home was purchased with separate funds or that the home itself is 
separate property, the cornmunity would still have an interest in the equity accruedfi·om 
the pay down of the loan because "when community funds are used to enhance the value 
of one spouse's separate property, such enhancement is community property for which the 
community is entitled to reimbursement." [Citing Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 172, 898 
P.2d 1081, 1083 (1995)] 
The market value of the home may have decreased by over $7,000, but that would 
leave approximately $31,000 in equity in the home that should be divided between 
pmiies. The trial court's conclusion that community funds in no way increased the equity 
in the home is clearly erroneous and not supported by the record. This issue must be 
remanded for further consideration given the determination in part one of this decision 
and the clear error now explained. Specific findings regarding the amount of equity in the 
home should be stated with clarity on remand and any division of the equity should be in 
accordance with established law. - Decision on Appeal, pages 4-6 (3-18-14) 
* * * 
In deciding that the pay-down of a mortgage loan with community funds created 
community property equity, Judge Nye correctly applied the law and properly cited to 
Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 172, 898 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1995). 
Defendant argues that it "is false" that Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 80 
P.3d 1049 (2003) requires that Jessica be reimbursed for one half of all community wages 
"that went to reduce the home loan." Defendant's District Court brief, p. 20. Defendant 
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also argues that "in its complete and accurate form the general rule with regard to 
reimbursement for enhancements" is as stated in Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 172-73, 
898 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1995) followed by this quote: 
It is very well established when community funds are used to 
enhance the value of one spouse's separate property, such 
enhancement is community property for which the community 
is entitled to reimbursement, unless such funds used for 
enhancements are intended as a gift 
Defendant's District Court brief, p. 20 (Bold not in brief). 
No evidence community wages were "gifts" 
In citing to that "complete and accurate rule" Defendant defeats himselt; he does 
not bring himself within the rule. Stated otherwise, there is no evidence that Jessica ever 
intended that her interest in community property wages were "intended as a gift" to 
Defendant. And Defendant cites to no such evidence in the trial record or in the appeal 
record before Judge Nye. 
The amount of enhancement was proven 
Further, in the following quote on page 21 of Defendant's brief the last line is 
exactly what Judge Nye did: 
[I]n situations where a spouse's equity in property has been 
increased through the application of community funds to the 
payment of debt on the property, the measure of 
reimbursement to the community should be the amount by 
which such equity is enhanced." 
The full quote would read this way: 
It is well established that when community funds are used to enhance the 
value of one spouse's separate property, such enhancement is community 
property for which the community is entitled to reimbursement, unless such 
funds used for enhancement are intended as a gift. E.g., Suchan v. Suchan, 
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106 Idaho 654, 661, 682 P.2d 607, 614 (1984); Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 
465, 546 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1976); Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 Idaho 44, 53, 277 
P.2d 278,283 (1954). In Gapsch, this Court held that community funds 
spent to reduce the principal of a mortgaged indebtedness on one spouse's 
separate property retain their character as community property and can 
be reimbursed. As the Court explained, in situations where a spouse's 
equity in property has been increased through the application of community 
funds to the payment of debt on the property, the measure of 
reimbursement to the community should be the amount by which such 
equity is enhanced. Id. - Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448,460, 
80 P.3d 1049, 1061 (2003) 
The holding and rule restated in Hoskinson originated with Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 
Idaho 44, 277 P.2d 278 (1954) and specifically and clearly reads: 
As a general rule where the separate property of the husband is improved or 
his equity therein enhanced by community funds the community is entitled 
to be reimbursed from such separate estate unless such funds used for 
improvement or enhancement are intended as a gift. The claim for 
reilnbursernent has been held to be in the nature of a charge or an equitable 
lien against such separate property so improved or the equity of the husband 
therein enlarged. It would appear that the measure of the compensation 
generally is the increased value of the property due to the improvements; in 
instances where his equity therein has been increased through the 
application of community funds to the payment of the debt thereon the 
measure should be the amount by which such equity is enhanced.* **We 
hold that the court correctly found and ruled that community ftmds in the 
sum of$2,514.78 expended to reduce the principal of the mortgage 
indebtedness on the separate property of the husband are and remain 
community property of the parties mul in the nature of a charge or £111 
equitable lien against the separate property of the husband. 
- Gapsch, 277 P.2d at 283 
It was not disputed that the pay-down of the mortgage came from "automatic" 
withholding of $400 every two weeks from Defendant's paycheck at Heinz Foods; 26 
payments per year. Tr. 42:11-16, 69:2-16. And $400 every two weeks for all of the four 
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26 pay periods in a year." Tr. 42:11-18, 69:2-4, 106:1-11, 179:24-180:2, 201:17-202:3. 
Judge Nye stated: 
The testimony in the record from Respondent is that he paid 
$400 every two weeks or 26 total payments per year towards a 
loan from his parents and that he was continuing to make 
those payments as of the date of the court trial. The home was 
purchased in December 2008. Assuming payments on the loan 
began in January 2009 and continued to the date of trial in 
October 2012, there would have been approximately 95 
payments (78 payments for the first 3 years and roughly 17 
payments in 8 months of2012) of $400 for a total of $38,000 
dollars in reimbursement on the no-interest loan from his 
parents. This would indicate that $38,000 worth of equity had 
been established in the Gwen home. The payments were nwde 
with income that was community property. Even assuming 
that the bulk of the Gwen home was purchased with separate 
funds or that the home itself is separate property, the 
c01nmunity would still have an interest in the equity accrued 
from, the pay down of the loan because "when community 
funds are used to enhance the value of one spouse's separate 
property, such enhancement is community property for which 
the community is entitled to reimbursement." [Citing Bliss v. 
Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 172, 898 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1995)] 
- Decision on Appeal, page 6-7 (3-18-14) 
Judge Nye correctly applied the law and the undisputed facts. 
CONCLUSION 
It was error for the Ivfagistrate court to award nothing to Jessica for her 11 + years 
of community wages that paid off the second Highland Boulevard home and reduced the 
mortgage on the third home on Gwen Drive that was jointly titled to both of them and in 
which they were residing at the time of divorce. 
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District Judge Nye corrected that error. And he did so in full-square compliance 
with established law and undisputed facts. The Decision on Appeal of March 18, 2014 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this 30th day of September, 2013 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
~-
( 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on September 30, 2014 I mailed a copy of the foregoing by first class 
mail, postage prepaid to Shawn Anderson, P.O. Box 95, Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0095, 
Counsel for Defendant. 
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